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PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSES: A NEW APPROACH
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of "public welfare' statutes. In most instances,
these statutes impose criminal penalties without the traditional requirement of specific intent, or
mens rea. Do these statutes, or some of them, violate due process? How are the courts to determine
whether the public interest warrants the imposition of strict liability? If the court decides that strict
liability should not be imposed as a matter of law. how should it instruct the jury on the matter of
the defendant's responsibility? This article considers these questions and others, offering a uniform
approach to the various forms of public welfare statutes.-EDIroR.
Recent years have seen a rash of "public welfare
statutes" establishing crimes which require no
criminal intent, or mens rea.' Courts have been
plagued with the problem of reconciling these
statutes with the requirements of due process.
A lack of criminal intent may arise in two dis-
tinct contexts, that is, through ignorance either of
the law or of relevant facts. 
2
Today, the plea of ignorance or mistake of law
is rarely encountered in prosecutions for serious
crimes.3 No sane defendant pleads ignorance of
the law when accused of homicide, for the obvious
reason that murder represents a basic violation of
the moral principles of society. Recognition of mis-
take of law as a valid defense in such a situation
would contradict those values. Yet, many plead
ignorance of the law when accused of an act not
generally known to be criminal. A corollary of
ignorance of the law is ignorance of a relevant fact.
Thus, though the defendant may be aware of the
substance of the law, he may be unaware of a
particular fact which renders his conduct unlaw-
ful.4 The cases involving ignorance of the law and
of the facts will be treated separately for purposes
of analysis.
I The term "public welfare offense" is used to denote
a group of police offenses and criminal nuisances pun-
ishable irrespective of the actor's state of mind.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 55
(1933).
2 The term "ignorance of the law" is used to denote
absence of knowledge that a relevant legal proposition
exists. The law is expressed in distinctive legal propo-
sitions. Facts, on the other hand, are qualities or events
occurring at definite places and times. HALL, CRIMINAL
LAW 376 (2d ed. 1960).
3 The ancient legal maxim "ignorance of the law will
not excuse," is still a maxim of our law. See e.g., United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Shevlin-CE; pen-
ter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
4 For example, a person may be unaware of an open
bottle of liquor in a car he has borrowed. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 43, §140 (1959).
MISTAKE OP FACT
In United States v. Balin the Supreme Court
held an individual could be convicted of selling
an opium derivative without using the form re-
quired by statute, 6 even though the indictment
had failed to charge that he had sold the drugs
knowing them to be such. The court looked to the
legislative intent of the act and concluded that
its manifest purpose was to require every person
dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether
what he sells comes within the statute. Here the
Court's analysis ends, without inquiry into the
requirements of due process. However, Congress
apparently felt that the danger from negligent
sale of narcotics was so repugnant to the public
welfare that it required strict criminal liability;
the requirements of due process may justifibly be
qualified in such cases. The duty of the individual
is greater in these circumstances because of the
inherently dangerous activity involved.7 However,
such a test is of little value when considering prob-
lems of conduct involving less danger to the public
welfare, where the public interest may not be so
compelling as to require a limitation of fourteenth
amendment rights. In these situations, it is sub-
mitted, the courts should weigh the individual
rights against the benefits of public welfare.
In cases where the courts determine that the
public interest does not warrant a limitation upon
6 258 U.S. 250 (1922). In a companion case, United
States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), the Court
handed down a similar ruling with reference to the
prescription of drugs.
6 Narcotic Act of Dec. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
Mr. Justice Holmes' illustration balancing an in-
dividual's first amendment rights with the public in-
terest presents an analogous situation. "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
anic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50
1919).
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(lue process, a useful standard of due process is
required. In such cases a fair approach would be
to ask: Has the defendant's conduct exhibited an
unreasonable disregard for apprising himself of the
true facts involved?
In United States -e. Dotterweich,8 the Supreme
Court upheld a conviction of the president and
general manager of a corporation for shipping an
adulterated and misbranded drug in interstate
commerce in violation of a federal statute9 making
any violator guilty of a misdemeanor. The district
court allowed the jury to determine Dotterweich's
individual responsibility for furthering a trans-
action forbidden by an act of Congress. The Su-
preme Court held that there was sufficient evidence
to support such a finding of responsibility.10
.Although both the instant case and Balint in-
volved drug statutes, Dotterweich, unlike Balint,
was not directly involved in the sale of drugs.
Both statutes are said to impose strict criminal
liability; yet, because Dotterweich was only in-
directly involved, the court allowed the jury to
consider his responsibility.
Allowing the issue of Dotterweich's responsi-
bility for the shipment to go to the jury is similar
to the proposed determination of the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's conduct. The most notable
difference would be in the phrasing of the jury
instruction. "Responsibility" is a vague term, and
the various implications of the agency relationship
could confuse the jury. Whether the defendant's
conduct exhibited an unreasonable disregard for
apprising himself of the true facts involved is a
more suitable and precise standard to use, once
the initial decision of letting the jury consider the
reasonableness issue is decided.
In Morissette v. United States" the defendant,
while hunting on government property used as a
practice bombing range, took and then sold about
three tons of old metal bomb casings. When
charged under a federal larceny statute,12 he
pleaded that he thought they were abandoned.
The trial judge refused to allow evidence of the
defendant's lack of knowledge. The Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that
8 320 U.S. 277 (1952).
9 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§301-92 (1959).
10 "Responsibility" is used in the sense of an agent's
responsibility for the liability of the corporation based
upon the shared responsibility in the business process.
"342 U.S. 246 (1952).
1262 Stat. 725 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §641 (1959).
larceny and related common law crimes require
MIMS red.
Here, for the first time the Supreme Court came
to grips with an attempted elimination of intent
in common law fields. The Court required more
than taking the property into possession, stating,
"He must have knowledge of the facts, though not
necessarily the law, that made the taking a con-
version."'1 3 One may conclude that if an offense
was a crime at common law, and there is a question
of the defendant's ignorance of relevant facts,
intent 14 must be proved, not merely presumed.
The Court never spoke of the due process question;
however, the Court's approach to the problem
seems to be based, at least implicitly, upon the
basic elements of due proccss. The question arises
how far these requirements extend beyond common
law crimes.
If an offense were not a crime at common law,
proof of intent might still be required where the
actor's conduct was brought under the protection
of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth
amendment. 5 That due process extends beyond
common law crimes is borne out by later cases. 6
The Dram Shop statutes7 prohibit selling liquor
to minors or to intoxicated persons and provide
criminal penalties, 8 despite lack of knowledge on
the seller's part that the person was a minor or
that the individual was intoxicated. These cases
may be categorized as mistake of fact situations.
They are generally upheld without the proof of
knowledge. It may be practically impossible to
determine whether a customer is a minor or drunk,
and it seems unjust to impose liabiity where any
normal reasonable person would have made the
same error.
The proposed test seems appropriate to this
situation, and the question would be: Did the
defendant make a reasonably conscientious attempt
to ascertain the true facts? While not a precise
test, it permits a determination to be made upon
the facts in each case. 9
13 Morissette v. United States, supra note 11 at 262.
14 Morissette may have had the general intent to
take the casings, but he did not have the specific intent
to steal, since he lacked mens rea. He may even have
had the necessary intent, but the jury was never allowed
to determine this issue.
"1See generally U.S. CONSTITUTION ANNOT. 751
(1952).
16 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
17 See 33 A.L.R. 415 (1924).
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §131 (1959).
19 Thus, an inebriate who is the exception and does
19011
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There are various other situations in which the
individual iz aware of his actions and conduct, but
doesn't realize that what he is doing or not doing
is unlawful. These situations may be catagorized
as ignorance of the law problems.
IGNORANCE OF THE L.-W
The landmark case involving ignorance of the
law as a defense to statutory crimes requiring no
criminal intent is Lambert v. California."0 Here the
appellant had resided in Los Angeles for over seven
years, during which period she was convicted of
forgery. Upon her arrest on suspicion of another
offense, the police discovered that she had failed
to register as a felon after her forgery conviction,
under an ordinance requiring every felon entering
or residing in the city to register as such. 1 The
state was unable to prosecute for the suspected
offense, but prosecuted petitioner for violation of
the municipal ordinances. The Court accepted the
defendant's contention that the ordinances dis-
pensed with the requirement of notice which is
required where a penalty or forfeiture might be
suffered for mere failure to act. The ordinances
required no notice, and the defendant alleged
that she had no knowledge of the law or probabil-
ity of such knowledge. The Court held that the
ordinances violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, when applied to a person
who had no actual knowledge of his duty to register
and where no showing was made of the probability
of such knowledge. The holding was based upon
not appear drunk, and who has but one beer at-a tav-
ern. might not put a tavern keeper on notice that he is
serving a "drunk person." On the other hand as the
appearance and number of drinks consumed change,
the conduct becomes blameworthy. In the case of a
minor being served liquor, while the appearance of
being over the prescribed age may not be adequate
alone, such appearance, coupled with all the required
identification, might justify a finding of not guilty for
an unsuspecting tavernkeeper who has done all that
could reasonably be expected in checking the minor's
age.
20 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
21 Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE §52.38(a) (1933)
defines "convicted person" as "any person who, sub-
sequent to January 1, 1921, has been or hereafter is
convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in the
State of California, which offense, if committed in the
State of California would have been punishable as a
felony."
Section 52.39(a) makes it unlawful for an% con-
victed person to be or remain in Los Angeles foi more
than five days without registering with the Chtef of
Police.
Section 52.39(b) requires convicted nonresidents of
L.os Angeles to register if thev come within the city on
live or more occasions during any thirty-day period.
the fact that the conduct condemned by the or-
dinances was wholly passive and wa- unlike the
commission of acts or failure to act under circum-
stances that would alert the doer to the conse-
quences of his deed.n
The discussion in Lambert concerns active and
passive conduct. The Court distinguishes between
acts of commission, including failure to act under
circumstances that should alert the doer to the
consequences of his deed, and conduct which is
wholly passive. Mrs. Lambert had lived in the
city for seven years. If she had merely visited the
city on more than five occasions during one month,
she would have violated the ordinance;n but here
Mrs. Lambert's conduct might have been active,
i.e., coming to the city. On the basis of the Court's
reasoning, this would have been a properly pro-
hibited activity. It might be argued however,
that such conduct would be passive in that she
was merely going about every day duties which
took her into the city on the five occasions. The
question arises as to the category into which the
Lambert court would place such conduct. Dis-
tinguishable, perhaps, is the situation where the
individual moves into the city and stays more than
five days without registering, which is also a viola-
tion of the statute.2 4 Here it could be argued that
the actor should be put on notice (in light of his
record) that such a movement might require regis-
tration. In both situations the conduct could be
considered active, yet each is penalized for mere
presence. In this respect the Lambert test seems
unfair in that it is quite arbitrary.25
- Of the Lambert minority of four, Justices Frank-
furter, Harlan, and Wittaker felt the Balint case con-
trolling, in that it emphasized social betterment. Mr.
Justice Burton merely thought the offense did not
violate the individual's constitutional rights.
23 See supra note 23, §52.39(b).
21 See supra note 23, §52.39(a).
25 In Abbott v. Los Angeles, 53 Cal.2d 674. 349
P.2d 974 (1960), the California Supreme.Court held that
the state had preempted the field in which the Los
Angeles ordinance operates. There is no state statute
requirement for the registration of all felons. However,
in the state penal code the legislature has provided a
scheme for handling these matters. Also, the policy of
the code's penal provision is to eliminate all penalties
and disabilities arising from a conviction once the con-
victed person has successfully fulfilled the conditions
of his parole. Furthermore, the state penal code does
require the registration of sex offenders and requires
careful records concerning the whereabouts of arson-
ists released after serving their sentences. Thus, the
state legislature has determined that certain types of
crimes require registration and others do not. On the
same day the above case was decided, the same court
held in Lambert v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles.
53 Cal.2d 690, 349 P.2d 984 (l060;. that a new trial
[Vol. 52
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Perhaps, a better approach to the problem
would be to inquire into the actions of the imdi-
vidual in each case. Taking Mrs. Lambert, for
example, it is reasonable to assume that the aver-
age citizen problJably did not know of the felon
registration law: likewise, 'Mrs. Lambert could not
be expected to know of the law, absent special
circumstances which would have put her on notice
thereof. A reasonable test to resolve ignorance of
the law questions would thus he "Was the de-
fendant's conduct such as would reasonably put
him on notice that an inquiry of the law should
be made." This proposed test is similar to the
Lambert test except that it emphasizes not the
strict characterization of the act itself, but the
reasonableness of the conduct. 6
In this area also, the judge must first appraise
the statute in light of legislative intent to determine
whether or not strict liability for the public wel-
fare would outweigh the individual's rights under
due process. Here the implications of immorality
prevalent in narcotics peddling are lacking. Al-
though we are dealing with a previous law breaker.
reasonable men could differ as to the extent of
duty to make an inquiry into the law.
Reyes v. United Statesn illustrates the reasoning
of some courts in upholding narcotics-registration
statutes. The defendant, an addict or seller, vio-
lated the federal narcotics statute-n by leaving the
United States and returning without registering.
The court held that he had violated the statute,
and that there was no necessity of showing intent
or knowledge of the statute. The court dismissed
ordered by the municipal court for Mrs. Lambert after
the United States Supreme Court's remand was pre-
cluded in light of the state court's determination that
the ordinance was invalid.
26 Because the registration ordinance was not de-
clared unconstitutional as it applied to the particular
facts in Lambert, such ordinances may well be applied
in situations dissimilar to Lambert and be upheld. In
the few states which have criminal registration statutes,
[CAL. PEN. CODE AxN. §290 (1955), (Sex offenders);
Aaz. CODE Axx. §13-1271 to 74 (1956), (Sex offend-
ers); FLA. STAT. A-,N. §775.13 (1959 Supp.), (Regis-
tration of felons; applies to counties with population
over 450,000); N.J. Star. Axx. §2A 169A(1-10) (1953),
,Narcotics law violators)], these statutes would tend
to preempt city ordinances. In the majority of otherjurisdictions which have no state statutes which pre-
empt the various city ordinances (see Note, 103 U.
P.A. L. REv. 60 (1954). for a listing of these ordinances),
these statutes would be constitutional on their face,
depending of course, on the particular fact situation
which might later hring about an unconstitutional
determination.
27 258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1958).
' 70 Stat. 574 1956). 18 U.S.C. §1407 (1959).
the due process question raised by Ltvw'rl beclause
the act was:
1. no mere non-feasance-there wa misfea-
sance: defendant crossed the border (ordi-
narilv lawful) without regi-tering (in an
unlawful manner).
2. such that it should have put the defendant
on notice. The failure to register was unre-
lated to the positive act of leaving the country
-yet such failure plus the planned departure
is under circumstances that should alert the
doer to the consequences of his deed." -9
3. not in violation of a statute deemed a con-
venient aid to police department bookkeep-
ing.30
The act of moving across the border is certainly
different than that of merely living in a city, with
no definite activity on the part of the defendant.
Nevertheless, the defendant might be justified in
an ignorance of the law defense if he could prove
he had no reason to be put on notice of the regis-
tration requirement. Here, the defendant's original
crime of violating the narcotics law might be
enough to put him on inquiry as to his duty in
regard to movements in and out of the rountry.
Under the proposed test, once again the basic
reasons for strict liability are weighed against the
implications of due process. The court might con-
clude as a matter of law that such conduct justifies
strict criminal liability and take the issue from
the jury. This is not as strong a case az Balitt.
however, because the instant case involves a-regis-
tration statute, the violation of which is not itself
directly injurious to the public.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held in United States v. Juzwiak3t that leaving the
country without first registering as a narcotics law
violator was a public welfare offense, and proof of
criminar intent was not necessar- to conviction.
The court held that in any event, since notice of
statutory requirements had been posted where
the defendant had obtained employment and in
various places he frequented, there was a sufficient
showing of probability of knowledge of the regis-
tration requirement. The court also relied upon
the "active" nature of the defendant's conduct in
leaving the country. As we have seen, it is very
9 This is similar it the proposed test but does not
attempt to correlate why the failure to register gnd
the departure should have been blameworthy.
0 See shupra note 29. at 782.
ii 258 F.2d 844 12d Cir. 1958).
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difficult to draw a distinction between active and
passive conduct.
Again, using the proposed test for a mistake of
law, JuzNiak's act would be viewed in light of
whether it was reasonable to expect that he should
have been on notice of the law, or at least that
he should inquire into the law. Here, the court
would have no problem in using such a test because
of the various indications of probable knowledge.
In State v. Birdseltn the highest court of Louisi-
ana held that a Louisiana statute33 making it un-
lawful for any except persons of a specified class
to possess hypodermic syringes or needles regard-
less of use was unreasonable; hence it was an im-
proper exercise of the police power in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court reasoned that the mere fact of
possession does not warrant a presumption that
the needle will be used by narcotic violators. This
case illustrates an extreme attempt to exercise the
police power of the state through a statute not
requiring intent.
Similarly, in a Washington caseM a Seattle or-
dinance 5 made it unlawful for anyone not "law-
fully" authorized to be found in any place where
narcotics were unlawfully kept. This had the effect
of creating an irrebuttable presumption that the
person found in proximity of unlawfully kept nar-
cotics was guilty of participating in narcotics
traffic. The court held that such an ordinance con-
stituted an abuse of the police power of the city
and a violation of due process. This case was given
much the same treatment as Birdsell, where such
a presumption was also unconstitutional.
Both the Birdsell and the Washington case illus-
trate somewhat different principles than Lambert,
but are alike in that the fourteenth amendment
provides a limitation upon the abuse of the police
power by the states. The irrebuttable presumption
made from the fact proved, i.e., possession of the
needle, is unreasonable in light of the legal, alter-
native uses to which the evidence might be put.
36
3- 235 La. 396, 104 S.2d 148 (1958).
3LA. STAT. ANN. ch. 40 §962 subd. (B) (1951).
I" City of Seattle v. Ross, 54 Wash.2d 655, 344
P.2d 216 (1959).
31 SEATTLE ORDINANCE No. 40149-9a as amend.
86061-1 (1957).
36 These cases are analogous to situations where the
actor has general intent to do a certain thing, st. h as
keep a bag of tools in his trpnk, but lacks the Sl- cific
intent to use those tools to commit a burglary. See
Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C.Cir. 1956).
Thus, under the proposed test in such cases, it
would be unreasonable to consider that the con-
duct would put the actor on notice of an illegality
where his conduct could easily be for a lawful
purpose.
There are various criminal statutes within the
public welfare area which have not been litigated
since the Lambert decision, one of which is a Con-
necticut statuten prohibiting use of drugs or in-
struments as contraceptives. Assuming that an
out-of-state traveler was accused of violating this
statute and he pleaded lack of knowledge, what
might be the result? The Lambert passivity test
would not recognize his ignorance of the law plea,
since his conduct was active. Therefore, the de-
fendant might easily be found guilty. Under the
proposed test, the question would be examined in
light of whether the person's conduct would rea-
sonably put him on notice. An out-of-state resident
might well be treated differently than a person
in-state who was more likely to know of the statute
or be on notice to inquire, because he could not
obtain contraceptives within the state.
COCI.cLUsro
We have seen that in certain situations the public
welfare may warrant the imposition of strict crimi-
nal liability. In other instances the reasonableness
of the actor's conduct should be considered. Gen-
erally, specific intent is required in all common law
crimes and where the possession of objects or acts
done may as readily be for a lawful purpose as an
unlawful one. Moreover, the aftermath of Lambert
has resulted in a realization that the fourteenth
amendment can be used to protect the individual
from disproportionate penalties. The major fallacy
in any solution to the problems in this area lies in
the attempted generalization on the complex prin-
ciples underlying the doctrines. The proposed tests,
however, provide a method of approach which is
realistic and in keeping with the underlying doc-
trine upon which the criminal law is based, mens
rea.
GLEN V. BoRRE*
3 CONN GEN. STAT. §53-32 (1958). Use of Drugs or
Instruments to prevent conception. "Any person who
used any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the
purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not
less than $50. or imprisoned not less than 60 days nor
more than 1 year or be fined and imprisoned."
* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
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